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Lay Judge and Victim Participation in 
Japan: Japan’s Saiban’in Trial, the 
Prosecution Review Commission, and the 






In September 2019, the University of California Hastings Law School 
hosted a symposium on Japan’s newly instituted public and victim 
participation systems in the criminal process.  This paper addresses themes 
raised by five scholars' presentations at the symposium, covering the 
effectiveness and impact of three different newly adopted systems of lay and 
victim participation in Japan: (1) the new 2009 law of the Prosecution 
Review Commission (PRC), a Japanese-style “civil grand jury” originally 
introduced in 1948, which gave the PRC the power to force the prosecution 
of formerly unindicted cases, thereby challenging and reversing the 
prosecutor’s original non-prosecution decision; (2) a mixed tribunal called 
“Saiban’in Seido” introduced in 2009, a quasi-jury panel of three 
professional and six lay judges in the adjudication of violent and serious 
criminal offenses; and (3) the victim participation program implemented in 
2008, in which crime victims and their proxies were allowed to express their 
opinions and grievances during the criminal justice process.  This paper also 
explores alternative trial venues through which the adjudication of white-
collar crime may possibly take place, including a new mixed tribunal, as well 
as the all-citizen, 12-member jury trial.1  While Japan’s Jury Law was 
suspended in 1943, its legal provision still exists as part of today’s criminal 
law, and public efforts have been underway to “unsuspend” and bring back 
the Jury Law in Japan.  Also discussed in this paper is the “revolutionary” 
 
 * Professor of Sociology and Legal Studies, University of California, Santa Cruz: 
hfukurai@ucsc.edu. 
 1. See generally, JAMES WILLIAM COLEMAN, THE CRIMINAL ELITE: UNDERSTANDING 
WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 11 (2005).  According to Coleman, white-collar crimes include: (1) 
occupation crime and (2) organizational crime.  The latter can be sub-divided into: (1) corporate 
crime, (2) state-corporate crime, and (3) state crime. 
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use of the all-citizen PRC in the prosecution of state crime, one of the most 
egregious of white-collar crimes committed by the government.  Specifically 
explored is the PRC’s role in challenging an “unequitable” bilateral treaty 
between the U.S. and Japanese governments and in extending Japanese 
jurisdiction over the adjudication of foreign military felons who victimize 
local residents. 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
The University of California Hastings Law School’s symposium 
commemorated the 10th year anniversary of Japan’s introduction of the lay 
judge system called Saiban’in Seido (a quasi-Jury system) and the 
implementation of the new law governing the Prosecution Review 
Commission (PRC), another lay judge system which was originally 
introduced in 1948.  The new system of victim participation was also 
instituted in 2008, enabling crime victims to participate in criminal 
proceedings, thereby radically transforming Japan’s criminal justice system 
and criminal procedures.  Under the leadership of U.C. Hastings Law 
Professor Setsuo Miyazawa, five prominent scholars specialized in the field 
of law and society in Japan offered engaging discussions on the newly-
adopted Japanese legal systems that have allowed the active participation of 
ordinary citizens and crime victims in Japan’s criminal justice process.  Their 
presentations were followed by two legal commentators, whose discussions 
extended into the realm of possible public participation in the prosecution of 
serious and violent white-collar crimes, namely corporate crime, state-
corporate crime, and state crime, in which the government and its agencies 
collaborate with large businesses and corporations in producing socially 
injurious consequences.2 
Prior to the symposium, Professor Setsuo Miyazawa asked all 
participants, including commentators, to pay close attention to, and make 
comments on, the then on-going trial of three Tokyo Electric Power 
Company (TEPCO) CEOs who had been forcefully indicted in 2016 by the 
Prosecution Review Commission (PRC) in Tokyo, Japan.  In issuing the 
 
 2. Coleman, supra note 1.  See also, Raymond J. Michalowski & Ronald C. Kramer, State-
Corporate Crime and Criminological Inquiry, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF WHITE-COLLAR 
AND CORPORATE CRIME (Henry N. Pontell & Gilbert Geis eds.), 200-220 (2007). 
The corporate crime refers to crimes by a private corporation or its trusted personnel for their own 
financial gain or on behalf of the corporation.  The state-corporate crime refers to criminal acts that 
occur when the institution of political governance pursues a goal in collaboration with private and 
commercial institutions.  The state-corporate crime often produces serious social harms that result 
from the close interaction and collaboration of political and economic organizations.  The state-
corporate crime also results from inherently distorted relations of the government and policies and 
commercial practices of corporations. 
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“forced prosecution” (“kyosei kiso”) decision to TEPCO corporate 
executives, the PRC reasoned that the hydrogen explosion of TEPCO’s 
Fukushima No.1 Nuclear Power Plant and resultant nuclear contamination 
in 2011 had led to forty-four deaths and many injuries.3  Thanks to the 
implementation of the crime victim participation program in December 
2008, Fukushima disaster victims were allowed to testify in the TEPCO trial.  
On September 19, 2019, one day prior to the date of the Hastings symposium, 
the collegial panel of three professional judges decided to acquit all three 
TEPCO corporate executives on charges of professional negligence relating 
to their role in the 2011 nuclear disaster at the Fukushima nuclear power 
plant.  
University of Hawaii Professor David T. Johnson opened the symposium 
with a plenary presentation entitled, “The Limits of Change in Japanese 
Criminal Justice.”  Professor Johnson’s presentation provided critical 
comments on Japan’s new public and victim participation programs, 
identifying many limitations, including the inability of the Saiban’in trial to 
adjudicate serious sex offenses and such white-collar crimes as those 
allegedly committed by TEPCO executives.  Professor Johnson also 
critiqued the ineffectiveness of the PRC’s newly adopted indictment 
decision, as only a handful of PRC-forced prosecution cases have resulted in 
actual conviction.  His talk was followed by Hakuoh University Professor 
Mari Hirayama’s presentation, “10 Years of the Lay Judge System; Now, Do 
We Have ‘Hope’ for Criminal Trials? Public and Victim Participation in the 
Criminal Justice System in Japan.”  Professor Hirayama critiqued Japanese 
prosecutions and their incessant “obsession” with trying to obtain 
confessions from suspects in nearly all criminal cases.  She argued that such 
an overzealous prosecutorial culture has led to the 99.9% conviction rate of 
all criminally indicted cases in Japan.  University of British Columbia 
Professor Shigenori Matsui examined the 2008 victim participation system 
and its impact on criminal justice proceedings in his presentation, “Victim 
Participation in the Criminal Process in Japan.”  Professor Matsui noted that 
crime victims and their families had long been placed outside of the Japanese 
criminal justice system and that the recent reform drastically improved the 
participatory status of the crime victims and their proxies during criminal 
justice proceedings.  Professor Matsui also argued that the active 
participation of crime victims and their proxies in the criminal trial has begun 
to make criminal defense lawyering particularly difficult in recent years. 
The presentation by Japanese attorney Megumi Wada explored “What 
the Saiban’in System Brought to the Japan’s Criminal Justice System: From 
 
 3. Ben Dooley, Eimi Yamamitsu, and Makiko Inoue, Fukushima Nuclear Disaster Trial 
Ends with Acquittals of 3 Executives, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2019. 
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a Defense Attorney’s View.”  She examined the efficacy of recent criminal 
justice reforms and identified the ongoing problems of the criminal justice 
system in Japan, including: (1) lengthy detention of criminal suspects prior 
to indictment; (2) prosecutors’ overzealous tendency to extract 
confessionary statements from criminal suspects under extreme mental and 
physical duress; and (3) extremely high conviction rates of criminal 
defendants in Japan, even after the introduction of the lay judge system.  
Lastly, Georgetown Professor Carl F. Goodman examined the history of the 
PRC, offering important suggestions to improve its function by allowing the 
participation of legal specialists in its deliberative process.  Wilfrid Laurier 
University Law Professor Nikolai Kovalev followed the five presenters, 
providing critical comments on Japan’s newly introduced lay and crime 
victim participation systems by comparing them to the lay participation 
systems of European countries. Professor Kovalev also provided valuable 
insights by comparing Japan’s systems to those of post-Soviet republics, 
including Russia and Kazakhstan, who had also introduced the jury trial, in 
1993 and 2007 respectively.4 
Using the recent PRC-indicted TEPCO trial as one of the case studies, 
my comments on the presentations are structured as follows: The first section 
examines the socio-legal ramifications of the new PRC law implemented in 
2009, including: (1) the effectiveness of PRC’s power to force the 
prosecution of white-collar crime, i.e., criminal offenses committed by 
“entrusted” officials and high-ranking personnel in corporate and public 
sectors; and (2) the efficacy of the continued reliance on Japanese 
professional judges to prosecute white-collar criminals who had been 
forcefully-indicted by the PRC.  This paper uses the definition given by 
former American Sociological Association (ASA) President Edwin H. 
Sutherland, who coined the neologism “white-collar crime” in his 1939 ASA 
presidential speech, defining it as “an illegal act, punishable by law, 
committed by an individual or organization in the course of a legitimate 
occupation wherein a public … trust is violated.”5  He also noted that a white-
collar criminal is likely “a person of [public] respectability and high social 
status in the course of occupation.”6 
Past research has shown that Japanese public prosecutors and 
professional judges have been reluctant to prosecute white-collar criminals, 
including powerful politicians, corporate oligarchs, and governmental 
 
 4. Nikokai Kovalev & Gulnar Suleymenova, New Kazakhstani Quasi-Jury System: 
Challenges, Trends and Reforms, 38 INT’L J. OF LAW, CRIME, & JUSTICE 261 (2010). 
 5. EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: THE UNCUT VERSION 7 (1983); 
GLENN D. WALTERS, CRIMINAL BELIEF SYSTEMS: AN INTEGRATED INTERACTIVE THEORY OF 
LIFESTYLES 129 (2002). 
 6. Sutherland, id. at 7. 
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elites.7  The special governmental provision of “Shobun Seikun (処分請訓),” 
which requires the public prosecutors to obtain a special instruction from 
government executives on the prosecution of prominent political and 
economic elites, has led to the dismissal of cases against many powerful 
political and economic elites.8  This special “secretive” directive was 
originally issued by the head of the Agency of Justice (a precursor to the 
Ministry of Justice) in 1948.9  One key, yet implicit, objective of the new 
2009 PRC law was to overcome the inability of the Japanese professional 
prosecutors to prosecute alleged criminal offenses committed by white-
collar criminals who had long been protected and shielded from prosecution 
by top government personnel in the Ministry of Justice.10  This paper argues 
that the culture of invulnerability shared among corporate executives and 
government officials, for example, has allowed them to commit major white-
collar crimes with impunity, including TEPCO’s corporate and professional 
negligence which led to many deaths and injuries. 
The second section explores the possibilities of lay judge adjudication of 
PRC-indicted cases, calling for the necessity to amend the law of the existing 
criminal justice systems in order to make possible the lay prosecution of 
white-collar crime.  Specifically, the paper explores: (1) a PRC law to 
recommend that the PRC-indicted criminal case be adjudicated by a newly-
introduced Saiban’in panel, i.e., three professional judges, as well as six lay 
judges selected from the community where the alleged crime occurred; (2) 
the possible resurrection of Japan’s suspended Jury Law, so that an 
American-style, all-citizen, 12-member jury would participate in the 
adjudication of PRC-indicted cases; and lastly (3) the possibility of 
amending Saiban’in Seido and Jury Law to extend their jurisdictions over 
white-collar crime.  TEPCO executives were forcefully indicted by the PRC 
for the violation of Penal Code, Article 211, i.e., “Causing Death or Injury 
 
 7. Hiroshi Fukurai, Japan’s Prosecutorial Review Commissions: Lay Oversight of the 
Government's Discretion of Prosecution, 6 U. PA. EAST ASIA L. REV., 1 (2011).  For Japanese 
prosecutors’ reluctant to prosecute U.S. military personnel who victimized local residents in Japan, 
see Hiroshi Fukurai, Okinawa’s Citizen Judge Panels vs. U.S. Military Hegemony: Wikileaks’ 
Secret U.S. Cable Document on the Lay Adjudication of American Soldier Criminal Cases in 
Japan’s Saiban’in Trials, 4 INT’L J. OF OKINAWAN STUDIES, 2 (2014). 
 8. See KAREN VAN WOLFEREN, THE ENIGMA OF JAPANESE POWERS 221-4 (1990); DAVID 
T. JOHNSON, THE JAPANESE WAY OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING CRIME IN JAPAN 131 (2001).  
 9. Secret Directive No.36, Agency of Justice, Prosecutors’ Office, 1948 (昭和⼆⼗三年法務
庁検務局秘第三六号訓令).  Detailed discussions on the origin of this secret, special directive by 
the Justice Agency in 1948 were discussed at the 176th Diet Budget Committee Session, Jan. 18, 
2011, available at http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sangiin/176/0014/17611180014006a.html. 
 10. Hiroshi Fukurai & Zhuoyu Wang, People’s Grand Jury Panels and the State’s 
Inquisitorial Institutions: Prosecution Review Commissions in Japan and People’s Supervisors in 
China, 37 FORDHAM INT’L L.J., 929 (2014). 
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through Negligence in the Pursuit of Social Activities.”11  The current 
Saiban’in law and Japan’s suspended Jury Law have not extended 
jurisdiction over criminal cases involving corporate and professional 
negligence.  This section thus explores the possibility of extending the lay 
judge jurisdiction to white-collar crime committed by high-ranking 
corporate and government personnel.  
The third section examines the political utility of PRC’s forced 
indictment decision in the prosecution of another special kind of white-collar 
crime, i.e., “state crime” which specifically involves the extra-territorial 
protection from local prosecution of foreign nationals who have committed 
crimes against local populations.  Given the PRC’s unique power to instigate 
the forced prosecution of the unindicted criminal, the last section looks at the 
Okinawa PRC’s decision to indict and prosecute a U.S. base employee for 
the death of an Okinawan youth, despite the fact the U.S. base personnel 
were shielded from prosecution under the bilateral treaty called the U.S.-
Japan Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).12  Similar to the case of white-
collar criminals, the protection of U.S. military personnel from local 
prosecution has historically created a culture of impunity in Okinawa and 
other regions with U.S. military bases, leading to the continuous 
victimization of local populations, especially women, at the hands of U.S. 
military-related personnel. The PRC-prosecution decision eventually forced 
both the U.S. and Japanese governments to create a special SOFA provision 
to allow the prosecution of U.S. military employees in Japanese courts. 
 
II. PRC’s Effectiveness in Prosecuting White-Collar Crime 
 
One day prior to the date of symposium, three Tokyo Electric Power 
Company (TEPCO) CEOs were acquitted by the collegial panel of three 
professional judges on the charges of criminal negligence resulting in deaths 
and injuries relating to the 2011 explosion and nuclear disaster at the 
Fukushima No.1 Nuclear Electric Power Plant.13  The Fukushima nuclear 
power plant had been owned and operated by TEPCO since 1971.  While the 
Japanese public had demanded the prosecution of TEPCO personnel, 
including top corporate executives, Japanese prosecutors had repeatedly 
 
 11. Penal Code 211. English translation available at http://www.japaneselawtranslation. 
go.jp/law/detail/?id=1960. 
 12. Hiroshi Fukurai, A Step in the Right Direction for Japan’s Judicial Reform: Impact of the 
Justice System Reform Council Recommendations on Criminal Justice and Citizen Participation in 
Criminal, Civil, and Administrative Litigation, 36 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV., 517 (2013). 
 13. Mari Yamaguchi, TEPCO Executives Found Not Guilty of Negligence in 2011 Fukushima 
Meltdown, HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 19, 2019. 
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decided not to prosecute them.14  The civic complaint filed with the PRC led 
to the review of the prosecutors’ non-indictment decision.  Three TEPCO 
CEOs were finally indicted for prosecution when the Tokyo PRC decided to 
reverse the public prosecutors’ non-indictment for the second time in 2015.15  
The court quickly moved to appoint special prosecutors from the ranks of 
attorneys in order to prosecute the CEOs, setting the date for the trial to start 
in July 2017.  For nearly two years, since the beginning of the trial, the three 
judge panel had heard testimony on the causes of the explosions at the 
Fukushima nuclear power plant, TEPCO’s failure to properly plan for the 
possibility of nuclear accident, as well as the effect of nuclear contamination 
of a large proportion of Northern Japan, including the southern region of 
Miyagi Prefecture and eastern and central regions of Fukushima Prefecture, 
among other adjacent regions.16  The Japanese judges had also listened to the 
aggrieved voices of disaster victims who were subjected to government-
forced evacuation from their hospitals, homes, businesses, and farming and 
fishing communities.17 
 
A. The Effectiveness of PRC’s Power to Indict White-Collar 
Criminals 
 
Professor Johnson’s presentation covered Japan’s lay participation 
systems, including the Saiban’in Seido, Prosecution Review Commissions 
(PRCs), the victim participation system, penal institution visiting 
committees, psychiatrists, social workers, scientists, including forensic 
experts, volunteer probation officers, and citizen volunteers in crime 
prevention.18  His presentation also examined the efficacy of the PRC and its 
power to issue the forced indictment decision after the implementation of the 
new PRC law in 2009.19  Professor Johnson stated that the PRC had 
 
 14. Osamu Tsukimori, Prosecutors Won’t Indict Former TEPCO Execs Over Fukushima, 
REUTERS, Jan. 22, 2015. 
 15. Jonathan Soble, 3 Former Executives to be Prosecuted in Fukushima Nuclear Disaster, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2015. 
 16. Justin McCurry, Fukushima Nuclear Disaster: Former TEPCO Executives Go on Trial, 
GUARDIAN, June 30, 2017.  For serious contamination of Fukushima and Miyagi Prefectures, see 
Teppei J. Yasunari, Andreas Stohl, Ryugo S. Hayano, John F. Burkhart, Sabine Eckhardt, & 
Tetsuzon Yasunari, Cesium-137 Deposition and Contamination of Japanese Soils Due to the 
Fukushima Nuclear Accident, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 
States of America (PNAS), Dec. 6, 2011, available at https://www.pnas.org/content/108/49/19530. 
 17. Tsukimori, supra note 14. 
 18. David T. Johnson & Dimitri Vanoverbeke, The Limit of Change in Japanese Criminal 
Justice, on file with the author (a PPT file shared by Professor David T. Johnson with the presenters 
at U.C. Hastings College of the Law on September 20th, 2019). 
 19. See also, David T. Johnson and Mari Hirayama, Japan’s Reformed Prosecution Review 
Commission: Changes, Challenges, and Lessons, 14 ASIAN JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY 77 (2019). 
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challenged and successfully overturned prosecutors’ non-indictment 
decisions in nine cases.  He also indicated that one possible weakness of the 
PRC was the ineffectiveness of its indictment recommendation,20 for only 
two out of thirteen defendants in nine PRC forced-indicted cases were 
convicted, i.e., a 15% conviction rate.  Considering the fact that nearly all 
criminal cases indicted by Japanese professional prosecutors have resulted 
in conviction (i.e., 99.9%), the 15% conviction rate of PRC-indicted criminal 
cases seemed extremely low.  Professor Johnson also examined two other 
highly publicized PRC reviews and their deliberations: (1) the PRC decision 
that “non-indictment was improper” in the Moritomo Gakuen scandal in 
Osaka; and (2) the PRC decision that “non-indictment was proper” in the 
rape allegation against Noriyuki Yamaguchi, one of the closest Japanese 
journalists and “personalized friends” of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.  
Yamaguchi had been accused of rape by a prominent female journalist, 
Shiori Itoh. 
The Morimoto Gakuen case involved the sweetheart land deal, in which 
government-owned land was sold in 2016, significantly under market value, 
to an Osaka-based school operator who has been closely linked to Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe’s wife.  After public prosecutors made a decision not 
to indict government bureaucrats involved in the land deal, the Osaka PRC, 
which received a civic complaint regarding the prosecutors’ non-prosecution 
decision, returned the “non-indictment was improper” decision on ten of 36 
government bureaucrats on March 29, 2019.21  The public prosecutors 
reinvestigated the case and issued yet another non-indictment decision on 
August 9, 2019.22  Since the PRC failed to issue a legally binding “indictment 
was proper” decision, the public prosecutors’ second non-indictment 
decision officially terminated the effort to prosecute the government 
bureaucrats suspected of having made an illegal land deal with the school.   
Another PRC case involved renowned journalist Shiori Itoh and 
Noriyuki Yamaguchi, a Washington bureau chief for the Tokyo 
Broadcasting System, who had invited her to dinner to discuss a possible job 
opportunity in 2015, and was accused by Itoh of raping her when she was 
intoxicated and had lost consciousness.23  Yamaguchi has been said to have 
close ties to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and other key members of his 
 
 20. Id. 
 21. Chinami Tajika & Takuji Hosomi, Morimoto Mondai: Sagawashi ra 10-nin Futatabi 
Fukiso: Tokusobu Sosa-Shuketsu [Morimoto Problem: Non-indictment Against Mr. Sagawa and 
10 Others: Special Investigation Concluded], ASAHI SHIMBUN, Aug. 9, 2019. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Shiori Ito: Japanese Journalist Awarded $30,000 in Damages in Rape Case, BBC NEWS, 
Dec. 18, 2019, available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-50832524. 
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administration.24  The public prosecutors decided not to indict Yamaguchi in 
2015 because of insufficient evidence.  After the public complaint was filed, 
the Tokyo PRC deliberated on the case and ruled that no indictment was 
called for.25  The group called “Open the Black Box” was created in April 
2019 by supporters of Itoh, to bring much-needed transparency into the 
secretive and “closed” nature of the investigation of rape and other sex 
crimes, because no detailed accounts of the investigations were shared with 
crime victims.26  Professor Johnson made the critical observation that there 
are two specific types of criminal cases that the newly-implemented 
Saiban’in trial has failed to adjudicate, despite their important societal 
ramifications: (1) serious sex offenses; and (2) white-collar crime and 
corporate crime.27 
As Professor Johnson noted in his presentation on the nine PRC-forced 
prosecution cases, it is important to realize that five of these cases (56 %) 
and nine of thirteen defendants (69%) involved the allegation of white-collar 
crime committed by highly privileged governmental, political, and economic 
elites.  Specifically, these cases involved: (1) professional negligence by the 
Deputy Chief of the Akashi Police Department in the Akashi Pedestrian 
Bridge incident; (2) professional negligence by three railway company 
presidents in the JR West Amagasaki Rail Crash case; (3)  insider trading by 
a company president in the Okinawa Unlisted Stock Fraud case; (4) political 
funding violations by Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) leader Ichiro Ozawa 
in the Rikuzankai case; and (5) corporate and professional negligence by 
three top corporate executives in the TEPCO Nuclear Disaster case.28  All of 
these crimes are alleged to have been committed by white-collar criminals. 
The devastating societal and human consequences of white-collar crime 
are well-known, including harmful impacts on human health, damage to a 
community’s moral climate, serious financial costs and economic losses, 
human rights violations, as well as the destruction of nature, the environment 
and ecosystems.29  Critical studies of white-collar crime have led to multiple 
classifications of a number of immoral corporate practices, unethical 
 
 24. See generally, SHANNA VAN SLYKE, MICHAEL L. BENSON, & FRANCIS T. CULLEN, THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME (2016) [hereinafter Oxford Handbook]. 
 25. Azusa Mishima, Journalist Shiori Ito Gets Help With Fight For Damages Over Alleged 
Rape, ASAHI SHIMBUN, Apr. 12, 2019. 
 26. Open the Black Box, Itoh Shiori-san no Minji Saiban o Sasaeru-Kai [Group to Support 
Shiori Itoh’s Civil Trial], last accessed on Jan. 1, 2020, available at https://www.opentheblack 
box.jp/?lang=en.  
 27. Johnson, supra note at 16 (slide # 10, on file with the author). 
 28. For the case background information of PRC-forced criminal cases, see Johnson & 
Hirayama (2019). 
 29. See generally, R. F. Meier & J. F. Short, Consequences of White-Collar Crime, in WHITE 
COLLAR CRIME: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY VIEWS (G. Geis, R. F. Meier & L. M. Salinger 
eds.), 80-104 (1985). 
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government policies and programs, as well as egregious state-corporate 
collaborative activities.30  Today white-collar crime is seen to include: (1) 
corporate crime consisting of illegal actions committed by corporations, 
business entities, and/or personnel who represent privately owned 
collectivist entities; (2) state crime committed by states and governments in 
order to “further a variety of domestic and foreign policies [and 
objectives]”;31 and (3) state-corporate crime resulting from the close 
collaboration between the policies of the state, on one hand, and the policies 
and practices of privately owned enterprises to maximize profit, on the 
other.32  Past studies have also shown that human costs and economic and 
financial losses resulting from white-collar crime have far exceeded those 
resulting from street crime, including more injuries and deaths due to 
dangerous working environments, long-term diseases associated with 
employment in certain industries, environmental pollution, and dangerous 
consumer goods, among many others.  In the U.S., for instance, the FBI 
estimates that the annual cost of white-collar crime is nearly one trillion 
dollars, compared with $15 billion for street crime.33 
The dangerous impact of Japan’s white-collar crime on the general 
population, the environment, the nature, and ecosystems follow this pattern.  
Among the nine PRC-indicted cases, three of five white-collar crimes had 
resulted in multiple deaths and injuries, including: (1) the Akashi Pedestrian 
Bridge stampede incident in 2001, that led to 247 injuries and 11 deaths, 
including nine children, ranging in age from five months to nine years, who 
had been crushed to death at the pedestrian bridge;34 (2) the JR West 
Fukuchiyama derailment accident in 2005, in which 107 passengers were 
killed and 562 were injured;35 and (3) the 2011 nuclear accident and 
explosion at TEPCO’s nuclear power plant in Fukushima, leading to the 
 
 30. Oxford Handbook, supra note 24. 
 31. See EUGENE MCLAUGHLIN AND JOHN MUNCIE, THE SAGE DICTIONARY OF 
CRIMINOLOGY 417 (2006).  State crime includes: (1) criminal offenses committed by security and 
police forces, such as genocide, torture, imprisonment without trial, and forced disappearance of 
political dissenters; (2) political crimes committed by the government, such as corruption, illegal 
surveillance, and censorship; (3) economic crimes violating health and safety laws; and (4) socio-
cultural crimes, including institutional racism and cultural vandalism. 
 32. See generally, Raymond J. Michalowski & Ronald C. Kramer, State-Corporate Crime 
and Criminological Inquiry, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF WHITE-COLLAR AND CORPORATE 
CRIME ( Henry N. Pontell & Gilbert Geis eds.), 200-220 (2007). 
 33. Scott A. Bonn, Why Elite White-Collar Criminals are Rarely Punished, PSYCHOLOGY 
TODAY, Apr. 9, 2017, available at https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/wicked-deeds/201 
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death of 44 patients and injuries of 13.36  The radiation fallout also 
contaminated many areas and regions beyond the confine of the Fukushima 
Prefecture, forcing hundreds of thousands of residents to flee from their 
residence and communities.37  All three cases involved defendants who were 
high-ranking: a Deputy Chief of Police in the Akashi Police Department, 
three former JR West presidents, and an ex-Chairman and two former vice 
presidents of TEPCO.   
In the case of the Akashi Stampede incident, the Akashi Police 
Department, its city government, and a security firm had been forewarned of 
the risk of another likely stampede in 2001, because in December 2000, 
during a millennium fireworks celebration, nearly 3,000 people had surged 
onto the same bridge, creating a similarly chaotic scene.38  In the 
Fukuchiyama derailment incident, the investigation revealed the egregious 
practice of corporate punishment and penalties assessed against train drivers 
for their failure to operate their train punctually.39  The train driver who 
caused the derailment incident was trying to make up for lost time by 
speeding the train up to 120-km per hour, far exceeding the safety speed 
limit.40  Furthermore, the investigation revealed that JR West had decided 
not to install the Automatic Train Stop (ATP) system to warn and stop the 
high-speeding train because of cost-cutting measures.41  The investigative 
report concluded that “there was a corporate culture that prioritized 
protection of the company’s [financial] interests over those of the accident 
victims as well as the public sentiments.”42 
In examining the causes of the nuclear disaster in Fukushima, the 
Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission 
(FNAIIC) concluded that the Fukushima nuclear disasters, including reactor 
meltdown, were man-made disasters caused by poor regulation and collusion 
among the government, the TEPCO operator, and the industry’s watchdog 
agency.43  The FNAIIC report also indicated that the magnitude-9 earthquake 
which preceded the tidal wave that hit the Fukushima No.1 Nuclear Power 
 
 36. Magdalena Osumi, Former TEPCO Executives Found Not Guilty of Criminal Negligence 
in Fukushima Nuclear Disaster, JAPAN TIMES, Sept. 19, 2019. 
 37. See generally, JEFFREY KINGSTON, TSUNAMI: JAPAN’S POST-FUKUSHIMA FUTURE 
(2011). 
 38. Kazuhiko, Nagase, Fukuchiyama-sen Dassenjiko no Mondai o Kataru [Discussing the 
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5 -  Fukurai 7/29/2020  10:12 AM 
406 Hastings Journal of Crime and Punishment [Vol. 1:3 
Plant could not be ruled out as a cause of the accident. Further, FNAIIC Chair 
Kiyoshi Kurokawa concluded that the Fukushima disaster was “a disaster 
‘Made in Japan.’  Its fundamental causes are to be found in the ingrained 
conventions of … our reflexive obedience; our reluctance to question [the] 
authority; our devotion to ‘sticking with the programme’; our groupism; and 
our insularity.”44  In each of these three catastrophes, Japanese public 
prosecutors repeatedly refused to issue the indictment against a government 
bureaucrat and corporate executives.  Only civic complaints from victims 
and their proxies, which were submitted to the prefectural PRCs, led to the 
eventual indictment and trial of the high-ranking professional elites.45 
In addition to the above three instances, the PRC also examined another 
white-collar crime that led to multiple deaths and injuries.  In December 
2012, a tunnel ceiling collapsed and crushed three vehicles in the Sasago 
Chuo Expressway Tunnel in Yamanashi Prefecture, leading to the deaths of 
nine people and injuries of three passengers.  The prosecutors examined the 
causes of the incident, and after the investigation, announced the decision 
not to prosecute ten people accused of professional negligence, including the 
former president of Central Nippon Expressway Company (NEXCO-
Central), which was the operator of the Sasago Chuo Expressway Tunnel, 
and maintenance supervisors at NEXCO-Central and its subsidiary.46  In 
August, 2018, victims’ families and a group of scientists who had also 
examined the causes of incident decided to file a petition to the local PRC to 
challenge the propriety of the prosecutors’ non-indictment decision.47  One 
year later, in August 2019, the PRC announced that the prosecutors’ original 
non-indictment decision regarding two inspectors of both NEXCO-Central 
and its subsidiary was not proper, forcing the public prosecutors to 
reinvestigate the case.  The PRC decision was not “indictment was proper,” 
and thus did not carry the legally binding mandate for the prosecutors to 
reverse their initial non-prosecution decision.48  Nonetheless, their “non-
indictment was improper” decision forced the prosecutors to reconsider their 
original non-indictment decision.  As of today, the local prosecutors have yet 
to make any announcement regarding whether or not they will reverse their 
initial non-indictment decision or will re-issue the non-prosecution decision. 
In order to respond to the aggrieved voices of crime victims and their 
 
 44. Id. 
 45. The trial of the deputy chief of police did not occur because the statute of limitation had 
expired. 
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families in Japan,49 the PRC has seemed to function as a civic oversight to 
question and challenge the culture of impunity shared among corporate 
executives and government elites, knowing that they would not be 
prosecuted for professional negligence regardless of the human 
consequences of their organizational decisions and business practices.  
Similarly, the PRC’s examination of the propriety of non-indictment 
decision on white-collar crime also seems to have questioned the culture of 
public prosecutors’ blind subservience to the special instruction from top 
governmental bureaucrats in relation to the prosecution of professional 
elites.  Further, the PRC’s legally binding power to initiate the forced 
prosecution of white-collar crime has challenged the corporate and 
governmental policies that have continued to prioritize their interests over 
the rights and safety of people, communities, and society at large. 
 
B.  The Possibility of the Lay Adjudication of PRC-Indicted 
Criminal Cases 
 
There are other perspectives that need to be incorporated into the 
interpretation of the “failure” of the PRC’s forced indictments to result in the 
conviction of white-collar defendants.  This failure may not be due to the 
structural problem or policy defect inherent in the lay institution of PRC 
itself, but to the existing structure of government policies and prosecutorial 
practices.  As stated earlier, the institutional directive called “shobun seikun” 
in the Ministry of Justice tends to prioritize the rights of government interests 
and the rights of well-connected political and economic elites over the rights 
and the interests of people, crime victims, and general communities.  The 
PRC became the prime lay institution to respond to civic grievances and has 
been responsible for the reversal of prosecutors’ non-indictment decisions 
regarding white-collar crime.  Without the PRC-forced prosecution, the trial 
of white-collar criminals would never have taken place. 
Another reason that the PRC-indicted cases did not result in the 
conviction of white-collar defendants is that the key decision-makers in these 
PRC-forced trials have been the Japanese professional judges.  These trials 
of white-collar criminals were conducted without involvement of lay judges 
drawn from the community where alleged crimes occurred.  Past research 
has indicated that Japanese professional judges have repeatedly shown their 
refusal to convict powerful elites and professionals, including government 
officials, corporate elites, prominent politicians, and high-ranking criminal 
 
 49. See generally, KEN SHIROISHI, KIGYOHANZAI, FUSHOJI NO JOSEISAKU [CORPORATE 
CRIME AND SCANDALS: LEGAL STRATEGIES] (2007).  
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justice personnel.50  Given this history, the court’s acquittal of all white-
crime defendants in PRC-indicted trials, including three TEPCO CEOs, was 
not surprising.  Some critical observers of the Japanese court had long 
predicted the acquittal of TEPCO corporate executives before the court’s 
acquittal announcement in September 2019.51   
The dedicated subservience of Japanese professional judges to the 
interests of renowned politicians, powerful government elites, and corporate 
executives has long been well-known.  Even in their rulings in politically 
controversial cases, such as the constitutionality of the Self-Defense Force 
despite public questions and criticisms, the construction of U.S. military 
bases against strong oppositions by nearby residents, and the operation of 
nuclear power plants throughout Japan, and even after the 2011 nuclear 
disaster in Fukushima, the Japanese judges have continued to rule in favor 
of the government’s policies and programs, despite public outcry, mass 
demonstrations, civil disobedience, street marches, and petition campaigns.52  
Past research has shown that many Japanese judges have sided with powerful 
politicians and the dominant political party in rendering decisions supporting 
their views and interpretations of the constitution, political perspectives, and 
governmental policies and programs.  Those judges who failed to conform 
to the dominant political current and ideologies were often punished, if not 
pushed out of the judiciary all together.  In examining the behaviors of 
Japan’s judges, Ramseyer and Rasmusen concluded that “judicial 
independence in Japan has real limits.  In politically sensitive cases, judges 
seem to indulge their political preferences at their peril.”53  Given the 
professional judges’ refusal to advance the interests and rights of people, 
communities and the environment over the interests of the government and 
corporate sectors, the following section explores the possible public 
prosecution of PRC-indicted cases beyond the bench trial system, including 
a newly-adopted Saiban’in system, as well as an American-style, 12-member 
jury trial, which Japan had operated for the fifteen years from 1928 to 1943. 
 
 
 50. See generally, Takashi Maruta, BAISHIN SAIBAN O KANGAERU: HOTEINI MIRU NICHIBEI 
BUNKA HIKAKU [THE CONSIDERATION OF JURY SYSTEM: JAPAN-U.S. CROSS-NATIONAL 
ANALYSIS IN THE COURTROOM] (1990).  See also, J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Why 
Are Japanese Judges so Conservative in Politically Charged Cases? (1999), available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/268.pdf. 
 51. Colin P.A. Jones, The TEPCO Verdict is Predictable But Not Insignificant, JAPAN TIMES, 
Sept. 19, 2019.  See also, Richard Wilcox, Democracy in Japan: Derailed by the Nuclear Mafia, 
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C. The PRC Amendment to Adjudicate PRC-Indicted Cases in Lay 
Judge Trials 
 
The PRC is a unique lay institution in Japan’s criminal justice system, in 
which the members are solely composed of citizens randomly selected from 
the local community.  The reason that the institution has been often called an 
American-style, “civil grand jury” is that its mission is to examine and 
inspect local public offices, including the prosecutor’s office, the police 
department, local jails, and other public offices to ensure that they function 
legally and properly.54  For example, California’s state law requires that all 
58 counties must impanel a civil grand jury for each fiscal year in order to 
scrutinize the conduct of public business by city and county governments 
and issue a report with findings and recommendations, followed by 
presentations to the Board of Supervisors and the media.55  Any civic 
complaint of possible white-collar crime committed by public officials 
triggers an investigation by the civil grand jury, as Section 925 of the 
California Penal Code specifically indicates that the civil grand jury shall 
investigate “operations, accounts and registers of the officers, departments, 
or functions of the county,”56 prison conditions and management, any willful 
or corrupt conduct on the part of public officers within the county, as well as 
report on the offices, accounts and records of the officials or entities of the 
county, including any special or legislative district.57 
The civic oversight function of government officials has been carried out 
by the grand jury in other U.S. states as well.  For example, in November 
2008, the Texas grand jury indicted then-U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney 
for a conflict of interest pertaining to his private investment in a corporation 
that runs federal prisons.58  The conflict of interest stemmed from Cheney’s 
political influence over federal contracts awarded to private corporations in 
the construction and institutional management of federal prisons.  The South 
Texas grand jury also indicted then-Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez for 
obstruction of justice, as America’s top prosecutor under the Bush 
Administration tried to stop the investigation of Cheney’s collusion with 
prison industries.59  Texas State Senator Eddie Lucio, Jr. was also indicted, 
 
 54. See generally, Hiroshi Fukurai, Proposal to Establish the System of the Federal Civil 
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 57. Fukurai, supra note 54. 
 58. Grand Jury Indicts US Vice President, NORTHERN TERRITORY NEWS (Australia), Nov. 
20, 2008, at 13. 
 59. Id. 
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as he allegedly accepted bribes from private prison firms.60  This was a great 
victory for the office of county prosecutors who investigated the case and 
brought indictments against prominent U.S. politicians.  Nonetheless, in 
December, a politically motivated county judge made an unprecedented 
decision to dismiss the indictments.61  While these venues of indictment 
occurred in different national jurisdictions, this offers another instance in 
which a professional judge tried to shield powerful political elites from the 
prosecution of white-collar crime. The grand jury indictments in Texas also 
demonstrated that there would not be absolute political immunity for 
powerful politicians when an equitable judgment on indictment was made 
by a select group of fair-minded citizens based on prosecutorial evidence 
concerning the allegation of white-collar crime. 
What happens to white-collar crime if alleged perpetrators are indicted 
and tried in court?  In the U.S., white-collar criminals have the option of 
choosing a bench trial or a jury trial.  Research has shown that such 
defendants have tended to opt for a jury trial, because the jury was more 
likely to place blame on corporations and business entities than on individual 
executives.62  White-collar defendants tried to convince the jury that their 
personal role was trivial and not worthy of blame, by distancing themselves 
from corporate and institutional culpability.63  Other research has shown that 
white-collar defendants also preferred a jury trial because a single juror could 
derail a jury from reaching a unanimous verdict, thereby resulting in a hung 
jury.64  In highly specialized and technically sophisticated cases, however, 
white-collar defendants tend to prefer the professional bench trial.65   
 
1. Attorney Megumi Wada’s Presentation: From a Defense 
Attorney’s Perspective 
 
Under the current legal system, Japanese professional judges remain as 
sole adjudicators of white-collar crime.  As examined earlier, Japanese 
professional judges and public prosecutors have been reluctant to prosecute 
highly-positioned governmental officials and renowned political and 
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economic elites.  In the post-2009 era, the majority of PRC’s legally binding 
indictments were issued against perpetrators of white-collar crime, i.e., 5 out 
of 9 cases (55.5%), with the majority of suspects also white-collar criminals, 
i.e., 9 out of 13 (69.2%).  Furthermore, the professional judges returned 
convictions in none of these cases. However, there has been an exception in 
the prosecution of white-collar criminal in recent years, as Attorney Megumi 
Wada elaborated in her presentation. 
Attorney Wada indicated that there was a bifurcated, discriminatory 
system of prosecuting white-collar criminals based on their nationality.  For 
instance, former Nissan President Carlos Ghosn has been detained for 
months and has thus far resisted providing a “confession” of his 
wrongdoing.66  Nissan is one of the six largest automakers in the world, and 
in 2014, became the largest car manufacturer in North America.67  Ghosn 
was arrested in November 2018 by Tokyo public prosecutors soon after his 
arrival from Lebanon on his private jet, over the allegation of false 
accounting, and was detained for the next 108 days on three other charges of 
financial misconduct and aggravated breach of trust.68  He was granted bail 
in early March and was again detained for an additional 10 days of further 
investigation and interrogation.69  His harsh treatment by Japan’s 
professional prosecutors represents a stark contrast to that of TEPCO CEOs 
or other governmental and political elites, as none of the PRC-indicted white-
collar defendants had been detained or subjected to harsh police detention 
and prosecutorial interrogation.  Attorney Wada indicated that Carlos Ghosn, 
who was a Brazilian-born French businessman of Lebanese ancestry, has 
been subjected to lengthy detention prior to indictment, and the court has 
repeatedly rejected a bail request from Ghosn, stating that he was a flight 
risk.70  His investigation has been prompted by a whistleblower who insisted 
that Ghosn had been misrepresenting his salary and using company assets 
for personal purposes.71 
Attorney Wada criticized the continued reliance by the Japanese public 
prosecutors on so-called “hostage justice systems” in order to secure 
detention and interrogation, so as to extract confessionary statements and 
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thus maintain an “extremely high conviction rate.”72  Attorney Wada added 
that Japanese prosecutors have also indicted Ghosn with additional charges 
of breach of trust, with his alleged misconduct expanding outside Japan.73  
Given Japanese professional prosecutors’ overzealous legal maneuvers and 
creative protocols employed to maximize the likelihood of his conviction, it 
may be likely that Japan’s professional judges will rule against Carlos Ghosn 
when his crimes are adjudicated in the professional bench trial.  Given the 
threat and danger of “unfair” prosecution and likely conviction, Ghosn fled 
Japan on December 30th and went to Lebanon, breaking his bail condition.  
He issued a public statement that he “will no longer be held hostage by a 
rigged Japanese justice system where guilt is presumed, discrimination is 
rampant and basic human rights are denied.”74  Ghosn added that “I have not 
fled justice [but] I have escaped injustice and political persecution.”75 
If the Japanese criminal law were modified to allow the lay adjudication 
of white-collar crimes, including those allegedly committed by Carlos Ghosn 
and TEPCO corporate executives, among others, would the trial outcome be 
different from that of the bench trial?  Under the current Japanese criminal 
justice system, none of the white-collar crimes, including PRC-indicted 
cases, are adjudicated in a lay judge trial, but rather in the professional bench 
trial.  If Japan’s public prosecutors and professional judges are unable to 
detach themselves from powerful political influence and bureaucratic 
customs and obligations, would it be reasonable to assume that the lay judge 
trial may offer a viable and fair alternative to the adjudication of white-collar 
crime?  Will Ghosn return to Japan if he will not be held hostage “by a rigged 
Japanese Justice system where guilt is presumed [by public prosecutors and 
professional judges]”? 
The following section explores the possibility of amending the new 2009 
PRC law in order to allow the lay adjudication of white-collar crime in Japan, 
including PRC-indicted cases, considering two possible venues: (1) the 
Saiban’in trial that was adopted in 2009; and (2) the American-style, 12-








 72. Id. 
 73.  Id.  See also, Ex-Nissan Chairman Carlos Ghosn Indicted on Additional Charges in 
Japan, USA TODAY, Apr. 22, 2019. 
 74. Ghosn Confirms in Statement that He Is in Lebanon, NHK WORLD-JAPAN, Dec. 31, 2019. 
 75. Id. 
5 -  Fukurai 7/29/2020  10:12 AM 
Summer 2020] Lay Judge and Victim Participation in Japan 413 
D. The Lay Adjudication of PRC-Indicted Cases in Saiban’in Trials 
 
It is important to reiterate that the classification of triable offenses under 
the Saiban’in law does not include white-collar crime.  As a result, none of 
the PRC-indicted white-collar defendants were tried in the mixed tribunal.  
The Saiban’in system introduced in 2009 was originally designed to 
adjudicate serious and violent crimes involving the death penalty or infinite 
imprisonment with or without hard labor, as well as crimes that caused the 
victim’s death by intentional criminal actions.  The class of specific criminal 
offenses under the Saiban’in law thus included arson, infringement, 
capsizing of trains, water poisoning, currency counterfeiting and its use, 
official document counterfeiting, burglary with bodily harm, indecent 
assault, murder, kidnapping for ransom, criminal insurrection, and 
instigation and assistance of foreign aggression.76 
Research has shown that the general public has complained about and 
challenged the public prosecutors’ refusal to indict and prosecute white-
collar criminals in the past.  For instance, among 113,427 cases reviewed 
by the PRC for the more than half century from 1949 to 2015, the majority 
were crimes committed by highly privileged white-collar professionals 
(51.0%).  The largest proportion of non-indictment cases reviewed by the 
PRC were professional negligence cases that often led to death and/or 
injury in the pursuit of social and economic activities.77  Professional 
negligence cases alone accounted for a total of 18,133 reviews (16.0%), 
suggesting that one of every seven PRC-reviewed cases was a white-
collar crime, similar to the ones committed by TEPCO and JR West 
executives.  These negligent cases were followed by other white-collar 
crimes, such as fraud (11.6%), document counterfeit (11.3%),78 the abuse 
of authority by special public officers (8.4%), and embezzlement in the 
pursuit of social activities (3.7%).79  While the counterfeiting of 
documents fell within the class of crime categories adjudicated in the 
Saiban’in trial, crimes of professional and corporate negligence resulting 
in death and injury did not, which meant that, technically speaking, no 
matter how many deaths and injuries resulted from the neglect of legal 
obligations and responsibilities by powerful private enterprises and/or 
governmental institutions, lay judges had no jurisdiction to examine the 
causes and culprits of such socially impacted crimes.  Thus far, the 
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adjudication of white-collar crime has been effectively placed outside the 
reach of the lay judge system. 
 
1. Professor Mari Hirayama and the Ten Year Anniversary of 
Saiban’in Trials 
 
Hakuoh Law Professor Mari Hirayama offered critical observations of the 
Saiban’in trial and its operation for the last ten years, arguing that the 
introduction of the lay judge system has helped transform Japanese criminal 
justice from a dossier-centered trial to an oral argument-centered trial.80  She 
also observed that the indictment rate has decreased dramatically, suggesting 
that professional prosecutors have become more careful about indictment 
decisions, exercising more discretion in decisions not to indict the alleged 
criminal suspect.81  At the same time, the “positive” aspect of introducing the 
lay judge system has also appeared, including the significant impact on Japanese 
legislation that has resulted from lay judge trials in sex crime cases.  The 
Japanese government has long neglected to incorporate the rights of women, 
including those of sexual crime victims, into the criminal justice system.  Finally, 
on July 13, 2017, Japanese legislation included a major provision regarding sex 
crime, for the first time in 110 years of its history.  The changes included: (1) the 
“crime of rape” was changed into “crime of coerced intercourse”; (2) males were 
included as possible victims of “coerced intercourse”; (3) “crime of coerced 
intercourse” became punishable with imprisonment of no less than five years, 
while three years or less were imposed on rape offenders; (4) complaint by 
victims was no longer mandatory to indict sex crime cases by prosecutors; and 
(5) new crime of “intercourse by custodian” and “indecent behaviors by 
custodian” against children under 18 was introduced, and the evidence of 
“assault or threats” was no longer required for these crimes to be established.82 
Another positive aspect of introducing the lay judge system, according 
to Professor Hirayama, has involved the establishment of a legal education 
curriculum for school children.  The Japanese government amended the 
government instructional guideline (“gakushu shido yoko”) in 2008 to 
include information on the lay judge systems, such as Saiban’in trials and 
PRCs, and the importance of citizen participation in the justice system, in the 
elementary school curriculum from 2011.  The legal education curriculum 
including the mock jury trial, was also introduced at junior high schools in 
2012 and at high schools in 2013.83  The discussion in schools of Japan’s 
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popular lay judge systems may have brought about greater awareness of the 
societal significance of civic participation in the administration of justice.  
As many residents of Fukushima and adjacent areas have been affected by 
the nuclear disaster, it may not be long before the students may begin to 
engage in honest discussion on the possible adjudication of white-collar 
crime in the Saiban’in trial.  Further, the participation in mock trials at 
schools in Fukushima may extend the discussion of possible lay adjudication 
into the realm of civil disputes on the compensation and monetary restitution 
to the victims of white-collar crime, such as disaster refugees and 
Fukushima’s babies and children who continue to suffer from radiation-
related illnesses, including leukemia, thyroid cancers, and infant congenital 
heart diseases.84 
 
2. Professor Shigenori Matsui’s Analysis of Victim Participation in 
Japan 
 
Another important change that the lay judge system has brought is the 
establishment of the rights of crime victims in Japanese criminal justice and 
the creation of their support systems.85  Professor Shigenori Matsui’s 
research has demonstrated the long history in Japan of disrespecting the 
voices and the rights of crime victims and their families by marginalizing 
their involvement in the criminal justice process.86  Today, the victims can 
attend the trial and express in the courtroom their opinions on the impact of 
the crimes.  Some victims are now allowed to sit together with the 
professional prosecutors, ask questions of witnesses and defendants, and 
express their grievances and opinions before the conclusion of the trial.  
Crime victims can also ask for a damage order against the defendant during 
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the trial.87  In order to protect the victim’s privacy, the court can also decide 
whether or not to reveal the name of victim while reading a writ of 
prosecution.88  Professor Matsui also indicated that various protective 
measures have been instituted to ensure the rights and privacy of victims, 
including the presence of support persons, physical fences to shield victims 
from the defendant and the general public, as well as the use of a video link.  
If the victim does not have financial resources to hire a legal proxy, the court-
appointed attorney is also made available.89 
These extra measures to protect the anonymity and privacy of crime 
victims in court, however, have not always been welcomed by legal 
professionals.  For instance, Attorney Megumi Wada criticized the newly 
adopted victim participation system because it tends to provide excessive 
uses of measures to protect the victims, including often “obtrusive” physical 
shields used in a small courtroom, and a video device for witnesses to testify 
in a remote place where the judges and attorneys were physically not 
present.90  Furthermore, crime victims could be present and allowed to 
express their opinions at trial despite the fact that the defendant continued to 
claim innocence.91 
 
III. The Resurrection of Japan’s Jury Law and the Lay 
Adjudication of PRC-Indicted Cases 
 
Another avenue through which PRC-indicted cases, including white-
collar crime, could be tried by lay judges would be through Japan’s jury 
system.  The American-style, all-citizen, 12-member criminal jury trial that 
operated in Japan from 1928 to 1943 was abruptly suspended when the 
Second World War began.  The Japanese government said that it would bring 
back the lay judge system once the war was over.92  The 1943 Jury Trial 
Suspension Act (Baishin Ho no Teishi ni Kansuru Horitsu) stipulated that 
“the jury system will be re-activated when the War is over.”93  However, 
after the war, the Japanese government refused to honor its promise to 
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reinstitute the criminal jury into the Japanese criminal justice system.  The 
General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP) 
also made numerous efforts to reinstate the jury system. However, high-
ranking Japanese bureaucrats and government personnel strongly opposed 
the efforts. Their arguments and official rationales included the ideas that the 
Japanese might not be mature enough to operate the jury system, and that the 
Imperial jury system in Japan had been a failure.94 
Regardless of these rationalizations, it is important to recognize that the 
Jury Act of 1928 has never been abolished, and the system of criminal jury 
trial has not been eradicated from Japanese criminal law.  Japan’s jury law 
has literally been “put on sleep” by the Japanese government, which is still 
refusing to act, despite its own Jury Trial Suspension Act in 1943 mandated 
its return following the war.  Thus, one way of reinstituting a criminal jury 
trial in Japan is to “awaken” the dormant Jury Law and firmly reinstitute it 
in the Japanese criminal justice system. 
The criminal jury trial had played a prominent socio-political role in 
Japanese society until its suspension in 1943.  For fifteen years, Japan held 
nearly five hundred criminal jury trials (n=484).  Each trial required the 
selection of a 12-member jury and alternates, suggesting that more than six 
thousand Japanese citizens had directly participated in the criminal jury trial.  
Jury research has shown that the popular jury frequently acquitted 
defendants (17%), i.e., in nearly one of every six criminal cases.95  This high 
acquittal rate is remarkable because the greatest number of jury trials took 
place during the era of Japanese fascism in the 1930s and early 1940s, when 
imperial prosecutors held near absolute authority and power over criminal 
justice prosecution.  Japanese prosecutors had arrested and prosecuted 
political dissidents, labor activists, left-wing academicians and scholars, 
journalists, prominent socialists, communists, and anarchists, many of whom 
were interrogated, tortured, and prosecuted in Japan’s autocratic criminal 
justice system.96  Yet, the lay judges had still rendered an acquittal verdict in 
17% of all criminal jury trials.  Similarly, the conviction rate of 83% in jury 
trials from 1928 to 1943 is significantly lower than the 99.9% conviction rate 
of all Japanese bench trials in the post-WWII era, as well as the 97% 
conviction rate of the new mixed tribunal since its introduction in 2009.97 
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Ever since the Japanese government decided not to revive the Jury Law, 
various civic groups and organizations have been exploring the reinstitution 
of the jury into Japan’s criminal justice system.  The public interest in the 
lay judge system was especially strong in the early 1960s, when the U.S. 
Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR) decided to introduce 
three systems of lay participation in the justice system in the Island of 
Okinawa, which is Japan’s most-southern major island.  In 1963 and 1964, 
the USCAR introduced jury trials in criminal and civil matters, 
respectively.98  The government also introduced the American-style, 
criminal grand jury system.99  Any person who stayed on the island for three 
months or more became eligible to serve on a jury, regardless of nationality, 
national origin, race, gender, religion, creed, or any other socio-cognitive 
barriers or identities.100  Since the jury trial was introduced and commenced 
during the Vietnam War, many military personnel and their dependents also 
served on the criminal and civil trials, along with Okinawan residents, 
Japanese civil contractors, Filipino workers at U.S. military bases, 
academicians, business owners, homemakers, and even trading merchants 
from the Middle East, among many others.101 
Chihiro Isa, one of the Okinawan jurors who served on a criminal jury 
trial in 1964, developed a strong interest in the democratic role that the jury 
played in Okinawa, and wrote a book on his jury experience, explaining the 
criminal trial in which he served, and sharing his personal views and 
evaluation of criminal court proceedings from the perspective of an 
Okinawan resident.  His book “Gyakuten: Amerika Shihaika, Okinawa no 
Baishin Saiban [Reversal: Okinawa’s Jury Trial Under the U.S. 
Occupation]” was published in 1977 and received the prestigious Oya Soichi 
Non-Fiction Prize.  Isa had participated in the criminal jury trial of four 
Okinawan youths who had been accused of killing a drunken American 
soldier.  The youths were acquitted of murder in the trial in which Isa had 
served as a juror.102 
His advocacy for the reintroduction of jury trial in Japan attracted wide-
ranging support from many civic activists and legal practitioners, as well as 
journalists, legal scholars, high school teachers, college professors, and 
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political organizers, among many others.103  Their collaboration and political 
advocacy for the introduction of lay adjudication in Japan soon led to the 
creation of two powerful grassroots organizations: “Baishin Saiban o 
Kangaerukai” [Research Group on Jury Trial or RGJT] in Tokyo, and 
“Baishin Seido o Fukkatsusuru-Kai” [the Organization to Bring Back the 
Jury System or OBBJS] in Osaka, Japan.104  The RGJT was first established 
in 1982 in order to foster and sustain “on the ground” civic discussions on 
the jury trial and the possibilities for broader public participation in the 
criminal justice process.  The RGJT also held discussions to reduce the 
wrongful conviction cases, due largely to the professional judges’ uncritical 
attention to the authenticity of confessions.  As mentioned earlier, the 
Japanese professional judges paid little attention to whether or not 
confessions were forcefully extracted from criminal suspects under extreme 
physical and mental duress.  The first RGJT meeting took place on April 2, 
1982, in Hitotsubashi, Tokyo and was attended by legal scholars, practicing 
lawyers, a journalist, a novelist, a former judge, young students, and other 
civic activists who expressed grave concern about the integrity of the 
Japanese criminal justice system.105  The RGJT decided to hold a monthly 
study session and share the idea that the introduction of active civic 
participation in the judge-monopolized, criminal trial process would insert a 
much-needed transparency into the Japanese trial and help reduce, if not 
eliminate, egregious wrongful conviction cases.106  The RGJT activity also 
led to the creation of the Toban-Bengoshi Seido [the Rotating Public 
Defender System] in 1993, an effort led by one of the RGJT founders, 
Attorney and Professor Hideo Niwayama.107  This system was later 
transformed into the Ho-terasu [Japan’ first Public Defender System] in 
2006.  Attorney Megumi Wada spoke of its socio-political significance in 
providing vital legal assistance to the indigent people and communities in 
Japan, including those who live in rural and remote areas. 
The RGJT members also began to establish branch offices outside the 
Tokyo metropolitan area, including the Kyushu Baishin Saiban o 
Kangaerukai [The Kyushu Research Group on Jury Trial] in Kumamoto 
Prefecture in Kyushu Island, Japan’s third largest island, and Niigata Baishin 
Tomono Kai [The Niigata Friends of Jury Research Group] in Niigata 
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Prefecture in Central Japan.108  The key RGJT organizers also helped launch 
another civic grassroots organization in 2002, Shimin no Saiban-in Seido 
Tsukuro-kai [Citizens Committee for the Creation of the Saiban’in System 
or CCCSS] in order to educate the public about the importance of civic 
participation in the administration of justice.109  When the CCCSS was 
created, the final architectural design for the specific numbers of professional 
and lay judges in the Saiban’in panel was still to be determined.  The RGJT 
and CCCSS had sent numerous proposals to the Saiban’in Seido Keiji Kento-
Kai [the Saiban’in System/Penal Matter Investigation Committee or SPMIC] 
for what they considered to be the ideal composition of the mixed tribunal in 
order to maximize the lay judge deliberation, including the proposal of one 
presiding professional judge and eleven lay judges chosen randomly from 
the community.110  SPMIC member Satoru Shinomiya, who was also a key 
RGJT and CCCSS member, led the discussion on the ideal composition of 
Saiban’in panel at the 24th meeting, on September 11, 2004.111  Shinomiya 
suggested the introduction of the de facto structure of a criminal jury panel, 
i.e., the possibility of eleven lay judges under the supervision of one 
presiding judge.112  While his proposal was not adopted in the final design of 
Saiban’in Seido, RGJT members’ continuous efforts to influence the 
deliberation of public hearing, by petition submission and direct 
participation, helped sustain important discussions on the idealized design of 
the Saibain’in panel in order to maximize the democratic role of civic 
participation in Japan’s criminal trial. 
Another civic grassroots organization, “Baishin Seido o Fukkatsusuru-
Kai” [the Organization to Bring Back the Jury System or OBBJS], was 
created in 1995 as a popular advocacy group to reinstate Japan’s once-
suspended criminal jury law.  Chihiro Isa also played a pivotal role in the 
creation of this civic organization in Osaka, which has maintained its own 
radio program every Sunday morning, called “Donatteruno? Saiban Seido 
[What’s Happening to the Trial System?] at Rajio Osaka [the Radio Osaka 
Station]. They have continued to educate the public about the importance of 
public transparency in criminal proceedings and popular participation in the 
criminal trial.  The civic organization has also become a strong advocacy 
group for reinstating Japan’s jury law and reestablishing the all-citizen 
criminal jury trial in Japan, insisting that the Japanese government’s own law 
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in 1943 had mandated its return after the war.113   The organization has also 
been critical of the newly-adopted Saiban’in Seido, which allowed the 
participation of professional judges in the deliberation process.114 
The civic grassroots organizations in Tokyo, Osaka, and elsewhere have 
been supported by a group of academic scholars, legal practitioners, civic 
activists, political groups, crime victims, victims of wrongful convictions 
and their families, among many other progressive sectors of civil society.  
They have continued to invigorate public aspirations for the inclusion of lay 
participation in the justice system and to promote the progressive democratic 
ideals of direct participation and self-governance in Japanese society.115  
Further, these organizations have continued to publish books and articles and 
to hold successful symposia and seminars in order to sustain citizen-led 
discussions on the importance of reintroducing the criminal jury system in 
Japan.116 
 
A. Jury Trials’ Lower Conviction Rate and Why It Matters 
 
Several presenters at the UC Hastings Law School Symposium made 
critical observations concerning Japan’s high conviction rates in criminal 
cases. Many civic grassroots organizations in Japan believe that the 
introduction of the all-citizen jury trial would help to significantly reduce, if 
not eliminate, wrongful conviction cases, thereby lowering the conviction 
rate from today’s near 100% to a much lower percentage, perhaps near 83%, 
which was the conviction rate in criminal trials during the period from 1928 
to 1943, when Japan operated an American-style, all-citizen jury trial. The 
expectation of a lower conviction rate resulting from introducing the jury 
trial in Japan is not unreasonable, especially given the high acquittal rate in 
the criminal jury trials that took place in Okinawa from 1963 to 1971. 
Although the number of jury trials in Okinawa was relatively small, the 
analysis of the background of jury trials, the profile of defendants, attorneys 
involved in trials, jury eligibility and selection, gender and cultural diversity 
of jurors chosen, and verdict patterns all reveal the rich and significant 
history of the jury trial.  Jury verdicts have had important sociopolitical 
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ramifications in Okinawan society.  A total of nine jury trials—five criminal 
and four civil jury proceedings—took place in Okinawa in the 1960s and 
early 1970s prior to Okinawa’s ultimate reversion to Japan on May 15, 1972.  
Jury research has revealed that Okinawa’s diverse juries returned an acquittal 
verdict on a large number of indicted charges.  The only exception is the first 
criminal jury trial that took place in 1963, in which Japanese American 
Bennett N. (Ken) Ikeda was accused of real estate fraud in Okinawa.  
Okinawa’s first grand jury had indicted Ikeda on eleven counts of criminal 
offense.117  He was found guilty on all counts by the criminal jury that 
included both American and Okinawan residents serving as jurors.118 
In the second criminal jury trial, U.S. v. Eiko Uehara Rose in 1963, the 
defendant was indicted on seven criminal offenses, including various 
charges of tax evasion. Eiko Uehara Rose, an Okinawa-born American and 
the wife of an American army civilian on Okinawa, was also the owner of 
the renowned restaurant, Teahouse of the August Moon (Hachigatsu Jugoya 
no Chaya).  The restaurant had been made famous by the 1956 Hollywood 
movie under the same title, starring Marlon Brando, Glenn Ford, as well as 
the prominent Japanese actress Machiko Kyo, who played the character of 
Ms. Rose.  At the jury trial, Ms. Rose was represented by an American 
attorney who practiced law in the Philippines but had come to Okinawa to 
represent her.  She was cleared of six of seven indicted charges by the 
criminal jury that included both American and Okinawan residents.119  In the 
third criminal jury trial, U.S. v. Chosin Kishaba and Yoshifumi Arashiro, two 
Okinawan men were charged with attempted murder, but the diverse jury, 
which included American and Okinawan residents and a Philippine national, 
acquitted both defendants of attempted murder.  Arashiro was found guilty 
of a lesser charge of assault and sentenced to thirty months in jail.120  The 
fourth criminal jury trial, in 1964, U.S. v. Megumi, et al., involved four 
Okinawan youths were accused of killing a drunken U.S. soldier. The diverse 
jury, which included Chihiro Isa as one of three Okinawan jurors, returned a 
verdict of not guilty on the murder charge for all four defendants.  In the last 
criminal jury trial, eighteen-year-old Michael Dickens was accused of four 
drug-related offenses in 1971.  He was found guilty on one account of 
possessing marijuana, but received not guilty verdicts on three other 
charges.121 
A review of the indicted offenses that had been charged by the grand 
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jury against criminal suspects in Okinawa reveals that the majority of them 
had been cleared by the criminal juries that, again, included a wide spectrum 
of the residential population in Okinawa, on the basis of race, ethnicity, 
gender, citizenship, occupation, and national backgrounds.122  As stated 
earlier, the jury qualification in Okinawa was extremely broad, for any 
person who stayed on the island of Okinawa for three months was eligible to 
serve.  These so-called “indiscriminate,” “international,” or “multi-
gendered” jury panels in Okinawa acquitted a large proportion of indicted 
criminal defendants, among them Okinawans and an Okinawan-born 
American.  The rate of acquittals was much higher than that of Japan’s 
previous criminal jury trials.  The political background and cultural milieu 
of Okinawa were quite different, of course, from those of the fascistic and 
right-wing ideologies during Japan’s pre-war and WWII periods.123  
Nonetheless, it is not difficult to speculate that the reintroduction of the once-
suspended jury trial in today’s criminal justice system in Japan could lead to 
a much higher acquittal rate that of the bench trial or the Saiban’in trial. 
If the suspended Jury Law were to be reenacted in today’s Japanese 
society, however, it would have to be effectively modernized to function as 
a democratic participatory system similar to the one previously adopted and 
operated in the Island of Okinawa.  For instance, the prewar jury had only 
allowed the participation of male citizens who paid the annual tax of 3 yen 
or more, and only 3% of the Japanese population was eligible to serve on the 
jury.124  Japan’s Jury Law thus must be modernized to extend civic 
participation to a broad spectrum of the population across lines of gender, 
class, ethnicity, race, sexuality, and other social identities and categories. 
The civic participation of women jurors in the justice system may be 
particularly important, as jury research has substantiated that the addition of 
women in jury trials has had a significant impact on conviction rates when 
victims or defendants were women, in addition to bringing a multiplicity of 
perspectives and life experiences into deliberative processes, thereby 
enhancing the overall quality of jury deliberation.125  Women’s active 
participation in jury trials in Okinawa might also have affected the trial 
outcome, as they often dominated the jury panel and deliberation.  For 
example, in the third Okinawan criminal jury that tried Okinawan defendants 
of Kishaba and Arashiro, women dominated the jury panel (7 of 12 jurors, 
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i.e., 58%).  The women-majority jury tossed out two Okinawan defendants’ 
attempted murder charge, while Arashiro was only found guilty of minor 
assault.  The jury’s international diversity was also significant in this trial, 
including two Okinawan jurors; one was a married Okinawan woman, as 
well as a Philippine national who was chosen as one of two alternates.126  The 
jury diversity and active participation of women might also have had 
significant influences upon the outcome of civil jury trials in Okinawa.  A 
total of four civil jury trials took place, and the plaintiffs in four civil jury 
cases were all women, who were either a single mother or widow or both. 
All of them filed civil lawsuits against powerful corporations, including U.S. 
transnational corporations that operated their business in Okinawa, as well 
as a local electric power company that was founded by Seiho Matsuoka, a 
powerful Okinawan businessman and politician who later became the Chief 
Executive Officer of the Government of the Ryukyu.127  In four civil jury 
trials, Okinawa’s gender-diverse juries all ruled in favor of women plaintiffs, 
awarding them hundreds of thousands of dollars in compensations.128  In the 
last civil jury trial in 1972, the civil jury awarded the single mother more 
than one hundred thousand dollars of compensatory damages.129 
It is important to recognize that both civil and criminal jury trials in 
Okinawa were characterized by jury diversity in gender, race, ethnicity, 
social class, and national origin.  On the other hand, jury service in the U.S. 
mainland in the same period had not been hospitable to women, people of 
color, indigenous people, the poor, and other marginalized and 
underrepresented populations.130  It is remarkable that these same 
marginalized populations from the U.S. had been encouraged to participate 
in both civil and criminal jury trials in Okinawa.  The active participation of 
women jurors in Okinawa, in particular, shows a real contrast to women’s 
participation in today’s Saiban’in trial.  Although the most recent Japanese 
census indicated that the majority of Japanese citizens were women, the 
majority of Saiban’in participants have been men (55.1%).131 
The analysis of the history of criminal jury trials in Japan in the 1930s 
and 1940s, as well as both criminal and civil jury trials in Okinawa in the 
1960s and 1970s, has shown that direct citizen participation in the 
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administration of justice had powerful and significant impact on the trial 
proceedings and the outcome of both criminal and civil trials.  If Japan’s 
criminal jury law were to be “awakened” today, Okinawa’s lessons show 
that it is important to include the broadest possible societal participation in 
the jury trial, including historically underrepresented and marginalized 
populations, such as women, ethnic minorities, and those from working and 
lower social classes. 
 
IV. The Political Utility of PRC-Forced Indictment against 
Foreign Soldiers 
 
The final section of the paper focuses on the potential utility of the PRC-
forced prosecution of “state crime,” which is one of the most serious white-
collar crimes committed by the state and/or its actors in pursuant of the state 
government’s orders and objectives.  The last section also responds to 
Professor Goodman’s suggestions to include legal professionals and political 
advisors in the PRC’s adjudication of non-prosecution cases.  While the state 
or the national government typically serves as the agency of deterrence with 
the tacit use of threat or effective deployment of punishment against criminal 
offenders, the state and its agents are also capable of engaging in criminal 
activities.132  Under international law, for instance, state crime may include 
genocide, war crime, crimes against humanity, and crimes of aggression.133 
Under national law, state crime is defined as the state’s activity or failure 
to act that breaks the state’s own criminal law.134  Similar to the case of 
white-collar criminals, where the secret ministerial directive and 
governmental rules have prevented Japanese prosecutors from prosecuting 
highly-privileged corporate executives, prominent politicians, and 
government elites, there have also been groups of foreign nationals in Japan 
who routinely victimize local residents and are not prosecuted.  The law 
adopted by the Japanese government has prevented public prosecutors from 
prosecuting foreign nationals, even though their prosecution is mandated by 
its own criminal law.  As a result, the rights of crime victims and their 
families have been systematically violated by the state government. 
One specific legal mechanism that provides special “immunity” to 
 
 132. PENNY GREEN & TONY WARD, STATE CRIME (2000); see also, PENNY GREEN & TONY 
WARD, STATE CRIME AND CIVIL ACTIVISM: ON THE DIALECTICS OF REPRESSION AND 
RESISTANCE (2019). 
 133. See generally, CHARLES CHERNOR JALLOH & ILIAS BANTEKAS, INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT AND AFRICA (2017). 
 134. DAWN ROTHE & CHRISTOPHER W. MULLINS, SYMBOLIC GESTURES AND THE 
GENERATION OF GLOBAL SOCIAL CONTROL: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 2 (2006) 
(the authors cited the work by Kramer & Michalowski (2005)). 
5 -  Fukurai 7/29/2020  10:12 AM 
426 Hastings Journal of Crime and Punishment [Vol. 1:3 
criminals is called the Status of Forces of Agreement (SOFA).135  Whether 
or not the state’s granting of SOFA and the establishment of immunity for 
foreign nationals who commit crimes, thereby fostering the culture of 
impunity, should be considered as state crime is up for further debate and 
discussions under state and international laws.  Nonetheless, it is important 
to recognize that the SOFA was originally designed to violate the 
sovereignty of the state and its jurisdictional authority to punish foreign 
nationals who commit crimes on foreign soils.136  Historically, the SOFA has 
been used by powerful states and international organizations to shield from 
foreign prosecution the criminal actions of their own personnel.  By forcing 
a foreign state to sign the SOFA, powerful international actors such as the 
U.N. and the U.S. have routinely violated customary provisions of 
international law and the sovereignty of the state by insulating the crimes 
committed by their personnel from prosecution under local criminal law.  
The SOFA also undermines the rights of crime victims and keeps their 
grievances from being incorporated in the adjudication process.  In 2017, for 
instance, more than two thousand allegations of sexual abuse and 
exploitation of children, women, and disabled or incapacitated civilians by 
U.N. peacekeepers have been reported around the world.137  These personnel 
were not prosecuted because the U.N. SOFA that governs U.N. missions 
insulated their peacekeepers from criminal jurisdiction of the host country.138  
On a similar note, in 2015, more than fifty Colombian girls had been sexually 
abused by U.S. soldiers and civilian contractors, but they have never been 
charged or prosecuted due to the SOFA immunity granted to U.S. military 
personnel in Colombia.139 
The concept of creating special “extraterritorial jurisdiction” was 
developed along with the powerful state’s efforts to expand imperial 
jurisdiction and colonies.  For instance, the concept of SOFA and provision 
of “extraterritorial rights” to U.S. soldiers overseas was advanced by U.S. 
War Secretary Elihu Root who began to witness the sprawl of U.S. military 
bases across the globe at the end of the nineteenth century.  The U.S. invaded 
Cuba, Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and the Philippines in 1898 and began to 
establish U.S. military ports and base facilities in the North Atlantic and the 
 
 135. See generally, Hiroshi Fukurai, Lay Prosecution of U.S. Military Crimes in Japan by 
Prosecutorial Review Commissions and the Saiban-in Trial, in JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM: AN ERA 
OF TRANSITION, (Harry N. Scheiber & Tom Ginsburg eds.) (2012). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Nimmi Gowrinathan & Kate Cronin-Furman, Rapists in Blue Helmets: The Crimes of UN 
Peacekeepers, ENVIRONMENTALISTS AGAINST WAR, May 2, 2017, http://www.envirosagainstwar. 
org/2017/05/02/rapists-in-blue-helmets-the-crimes-of-un-peacekeepers/. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Sibylla Brodzinsky, US Army Investigates Reports That Soldiers Raped Dozens in 
Colombia, GUARDIAN, Apr. 7, 2015. 
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Pacific Basins.140  Under Root’s leadership, the U.S. government also began 
to develop the legal framework of bilateral and multilateral military 
agreements in protecting U.S. armed forces from prosecution under domestic 
and international laws while stationed in a foreign state.  At present, the U.S. 
government has signed more than one hundred Status of Forces Agreement 
(SOFA) and successfully placed military personnel in more than one 
hundred and fifty countries across the globe.141 
The U.S.-Japan SOFA signed in 1960 provided U.S. military personnel 
“extraterritorial” immunity from prosecution under Japanese jurisdiction.  In 
Okinawa, where three-quarters of all the U.S. military bases in Japan are 
stationed, for example, the failure of local government to punish criminals 
had long created a culture of impunity among military personnel, 
dependents, and civic employees, thereby fermenting the false liberty of 
criminality that led to further victimization of local residents and 
communities.  From 1972 to 2015, military personnel have committed a total 
of 574 serious and violent crimes against local residents, including 394 
robbery cases (n=548 robbers), 129 rapes (n=147), 26 murders (n=34), and 
25 arson cases (n=12) in Okinawa.142  For the five year period from 1964 to 
1968 alone, U.S. military personnel and their dependents committed a total 
of 5,376 crimes, including 504 serious and violent crimes in Okinawa.143  
Okinawa has suffered from the continued victimization of local residents and 
their communities, as a strong sense of impunity has been shared among 
military personnel for many decades. 
 
A. The PRC-Forced Prosecution of Military Personnel:  
The Death of Yogi Koki 
 
While the SOFA effectively prevents the prosecution of U.S. soldiers 
under Japanese law, an exception occurred in Okinawa when the all-citizen 
PRC decided to prosecute U.S. military personnel, reversing the Naha public 
prosecutors’ non-indictment decision.  Similar to the PRC decisions of 
forced prosecution against white-collar criminals who had been long 
 
 140. For the historical background on the U.S. development of extraterritorial rights, see 
Chalmers Johnson, Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic (2004). 
 141. R. Chuck Mason, Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA): What Is It, and How Has It Been 
Utilized 2 (2015) (“The United States is currently party to more than 100 agreements that may be 
considered as SOFAs”).  See also, Defense Manpower Data Center, Number of Military and DoD 
Appropriated Fund (APF) Civilian Personnel Permanently Assigned by Duty Location and 
Service/Component (2019). 
 142. Fukkigo 574-Ken, Oinawa Beigunjin, Gunzoku Kyoaku Hanzai [Since the 1972 Reversion 
to Japan, 574 Criminal Cases by U.S. Military Personnel and Their Dependents], RYUKYU 
SHIMPO, May 20, 2016. 
 143. Id. 
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protected by Japanese prosecutors and professional judges, PRC’s forced 
prosecution decision in Okinawa punctured a huge hole in the culture of 
impunity long enjoyed by U.S. armed forces personnel, dependents, and 
civilian contractors. 
In January 2011, a twenty-three-year-old military civic employee Rufus 
James Ramsey III, who had consumed alcohol at the base party and was 
driving back to his apartment, veered into an opposing lane and crashed into 
a compact car driven by a nineteen-year-old Okinawan youth Yogi Koko, 
killing him instantly.144  Ramsey was taken to U.S. Naval Hospital Okinawa 
on Camp Lester and soon released.  In March, the Naha public prosecutors 
announced that they decided not to indict the civic employee, since the traffic 
collision took place, according to the U.S. military, while he was on official 
duty, citing SOFA’s Article 17, in which the American military exercises 
primary jurisdiction over all accidents or crimes committed while on official 
duty.145  The driver soon had his driving privilege suspended for the next 5 
years.146  He was not tried in the military tribunal, as he was not a member 
of U.S. armed forces.147  In Okinawa, DUI-related auto-accidents caused by 
U.S. base personnel have not been uncommon.  Between 1981 and 2016, a 
total of 3,613 drunk-driving accidents were caused by U.S. military 
personnel, resulting in 82 deaths and 4,024 injuries.  Yet, the punishment 
against drivers was almost nonexistent.148 
This time, Yogi’s mother, friends, and concerned community members 
had discussions with prominent Okinawan attorney Toshio Ikemiyagi, who 
suggested that the mother and supporters might petition the Naha PRC to 
review the non-indictment decision rendered by the Naha prosecutors’ 
office.  Upon their request, Attorney Ikemiyagi then filed a petition on behalf 
of the mother asking the Naha PRC to review the non-indictment decision.  
In May 2011, the Naha PRC deliberated on the case and announced that the 
indictment should have been issued in the first instance, reversing the 
 
 144. Japanese Man Died after Vehicle Collision with AAFES Employee on Okinawa, STARS & 
STRIPES, Jan. 13, 2011 (hereinafter AAFES).  See also, Beiheihanzai Fukiso ni Kogi [Protest 
against Non-Prosecutorial Decision], AKAHATA SHIMBUN, Apr. 19, 2011. Drinking at USF 
‘Official Event’ is Regarded as Party of ‘Official Duty’, JAPAN PRESS WEEKLY, Apr. 24 & 26, 
2011. 
 145. AAFES, supra note 144. 
 146. Beigunzoku, Kisosoto Chiikyotei ga Hikokusekini [“Indictment is Proper” for Military 
Employee: SOFA is on Defendant’s Seat], OKINAWA TIMES, May 29, 2011 (hereinafter 
Beigunzoku). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Nihon Heiwa Iinkai [Japanese Peace Commission], Okinawa deno Beikaiheitaiin ni yoru 
Inshuunten Shibojiko ni Kogisi, Beigunkichi no Tekkyo o Motomeru [The Elimination of U.S. 
Military Bases in Okinawa Due to Drunk-Driving Accidents Resulting in Deaths and Injuries by 
U.S. Marine Soldiers], Nov. 20, 2017, available at http://j-peace.org/2011/statement/pdf/insyu 
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prosecutors’ non-indictment decision.149 
According to the new 2009 PRC law, after the PRC issued the indictment 
decision, the local prosecutor’s office was required to respond to the PRC’s 
decision within a three-month window.  An unexpected event took place in 
this case.  First, the local prosecutors did not make an announcement of the 
results of the reinvestigation of the case, as mandated by the new PRC law.  
Second, in November 2011, the U.S.-Japan Joint committee, not the Naha 
prosecutor’s office, made a sudden announcement on this case.  The U.S.-
Japan Joint Committee is the bilateral panel charged with administering the 
SOFA, largely in secret.  Third, there was an unprecedented decision that, in 
a period of peacetime, the military employee would not be protected by the 
SOFA provision.150 
Specifically, the U.S.-Japan Joint Committee announced that if a 
member of the armed forces or a military-linked civilian is caught by 
Japanese police while driving drunk, they would lose their “extraterritorial” 
status under SOFA and Japan would have the right to exercise primary 
jurisdiction, whether they were on or off duty.  Secondly, since civilian 
workers were not subject to the U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice 
(UCMJ), they could not be tried in a U.S. military court.  They must then be 
tried in a civilian court and could be taken to the U.S. to be tried in a civil 
court.  Thirdly, if U.S. authorities determine the transfer to the U.S. to be 
logistically impossible, the U.S. may decline to prosecute them.  At that 
point, Japan can formally request to try the case, and the U.S. is supposed to 
grant a “sympathetic consideration” in handing the suspect to the Japanese 
prosecutors.151  Lastly, the Japanese government would be allowed to 
exercise the primary jurisdiction over such a case.  Two days after the U.S.-
Japan Joint Committee’s announcement, the Naha prosecutors’ office issued 
the indictment against the military employee, who was then arrested, 
prosecuted, convicted in the Naha district court, and sent to Japanese prison 
for 18 months for vehicular manslaughter.152 
This PRC’s forced prosecution decision was significant and effective in 
puncturing an unprecedented hole in the SOFA’s immunity provision for 
military-related personnel.  It is equally important to recognize the 
importance of the PRC petition filed by the veteran Okinawan attorney on 
behalf of the mother of the auto accident victim.  In the petition submitted to 
the PRC, Attorney Toshio Ikemiyagi had enlisted key legal decisions and 
 
 149. Id. 
 150. Okinawa Presec Indict U.S. Base Employee, HOUSE OF JAPAN, Nov. 25, 2011.  See also, 
U.S. Civilian Worker in Okinawa Indicted for Fatality, ASAHI SHIMBUN, Nov. 25, 2011. 
 151. Eric Johnston, SOFA A Source of Sovereign Conflicts, JAPAN TIMES, July 31, 2012. 
 152. Travis J. Tritten & Chiyomi Sumida, American on Okinawa Gets 18 Months in Prison for 
Vehicle Manslaughter, STARS & STRIPES, Feb. 22, 2012. 
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justifications in arguing that the military employee should be indicted and 
prosecuted in Japan.153  First, he indicated that the U.S. Supreme Court in 
1960 handed down the decision that during a time of peace, the SOFA 
protection of military personnel would not be extended to civilian employees 
of American military bases overseas.  Specifically, the ruling in McElroy v. 
Guagliardo in 1960 determined that during peacetime, the Uniform Code of 
Military justice (UCML) could not be applied to civilian employees of U.S. 
Armed Forces overseas in non-capital offenses.  The ruling thus recognized 
that different jurisdictional applications existed between U.S. Armed Forces 
service members and civilian components of military personnel.154  Another 
U.S. Supreme Court ruling, in Grisham v. Hagan in 1960, similarly 
determined that, even in capital cases, different jurisdictional principles 
could be applied to civilian employees overseas.155  Ikemiyagi’s PRC 
petition had influenced the PRC deliberation, as the PRC’s Principal 
Statement (giketsu no shushi) issued by the Naha PRC in May 27, 2011, 
reversing the Naha prosecutors’ non-indictment decision, also cited these 
two U.S. Supreme Court decisions.156 
Second, the PRC Principal Statement had also cited other exclusionary 
provisions of civil employees at U.S. military bases overseas.  The PRC 
statement cited that under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
SOFA provision, civic employees and dependent families of military 
personnel were not considered to be protected under the NATO SOFA that 
had been signed with multiple European countries.157  Third, the PRC 
Principal Statement indicated that the Supreme Court of Korea had made a 
similar decision on the limited coverage of jurisdiction over the civilians 
employed in the U.S. military base in South Korea, in which the U.S. military 
had no right to exercise its jurisdiction over civilian workers of American 
military bases in South Korea during peacetime, as related to the 1960 U.S. 
Supreme Court rulings.158 
Lastly, as Ikemiyagi indicated in his PRC petition, which was re-cited in 
the PRC Principal Statement, civilian employees at the military bases are not 
members of U.S. military personnel, and their crimes were therefore not 
subjected to adjudication by the U.S. Court Marshal, since the Uniform Code 
of Military Procedure (UCMP) has jurisdiction over U.S. military personnel, 
not civilian employees.  The PRC then suggested that civic employees should 
 
 153. Personal interview of Attorney conducted by the author on Nov. 30, 2016, at his law office 
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 154. McElroy v. United States ex rel Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960). 
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 156. The PRC Resolution Statement, May 27, 2011 (on file with the author). 
 157. Beigunzoku, supra note 146.  See also, Petition to Naha Prosecution Review Commission, 
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be properly subjected to the U.S.-Japan SOFA Article 17, section (1) (b), 
which states that “the authorities of Japan shall have jurisdiction over the 
members of USAF, the civilian component, and their dependents, with 
respect to offenses committed within the territory of Japan and punishable 
by the law of Japan.”159  The PRC Principal Statement thus concluded that 
Ramsey, a civilian employee at a U.S. base, should be properly indicted and 
tried in Japanese court.  This whole process of turnaround from the 
Okinawan youth’s death to the PRC’s prosecution decision took place 
quickly, suggesting that the PRC had acted on the review of the petition 
expediently and enthusiastically.  The PRC’s pro-indictment decision was 
prompt and decisive: the Okinawan youth’s death occurred on January 12, 
2011; the petition to the Naha PRC was filed on April 25, 2011; and the PRC 
decision that supported the indictment of a civilian employee was announced 
on May 27, 2011.  
 
B.  The PRC’s Failure of Prosecution: The Death of Yoshio Onda 
 
The PRC decision on the death of Yogi Koki due to the culpability of 
civilian personnel  and the prosecution in Japanese court stands in contrast 
to another case of civilian death caused by a civic military employee that 
took place in Yamaguchi Prefecture.  In September 2010, 66-year-old 
Yoshio Onda was killed by a car driven by civilian employee Jamie M. 
Wallace, who worked at U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni in 
Yamaguchi Prefecture.  The Marine airfield military base is located at the 
southwestern tip of Japan’s largest island, Honshu.  Onda had been the 
president of a neighborhood association and a key member of “Atagoyama 
o Mamoru Kai [The Protection Group of Mt. Atago or PGMA],” who had 
been protesting the construction of a 1,060-unit housing project on Mt. Atago 
for U.S. military personnel next to the Marine airfield.  The investigation of 
the auto accident near the military base revealed that Onda’s body flew 
nearly sixty feet, killing him instantly.  The incident also took place without 
any sign or trace of brake marks by the colliding automobile driven by 
Wallace.160  Soon after the accident, nearby residents and witnesses of the 
accident surrounded Wallace and her vehicle so that she would not escape 
into the base.161 
 
 159. U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement, available at https://www.nichibenren.or.jp/ 
library/en/document/data/140220_2_opinion.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2019). 
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[Iwakuni: Military-Related Personnel Killed Local Resident: Occupier-Minded U.S. Military], 
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Onda’s life had been largely influenced by his war experience.  Onda’s 
father was killed in the Philippines during the Second World War, when he 
was one year old, and one of his sisters and some cousins were killed by the 
nuclear blast in Hiroshima in 1945.  His mother had to take care of her family 
by working at a nearby U.S. military base, and died when she was only 51 
years of age.162  After the incident, the Yamaguchi prosecutors issued the 
non-indictment decision because the accident took place while Wallace was 
on official duty, and the administrative punishment was soon handed down 
to Wallace, as her driving privileges were suspended for four months for 
causing the deadly accident.163 
After Onda’s death, his remaining family filed a complaint to the 
Yamaguchi PRC to review the prosecutors’ non-indictment decision against 
Wallace.  The Yamaguchi PRC decided in March 2011 that the prosecutors’ 
original non-indictment was proper, stating “the accident took place while 
on-duty.  As indicated in the U.S.-Japan SOFA, the duty status properly gives 
the U.S. government the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over the 
accident, [thereby the non-indictment by the Japanese prosecutors was 
proper].”164 
There are a number of similarities between the deaths of Yogi Koki and 
Yoshio Onda and the surrounding circumstances.  First, their whole lives had 
been deeply affected by the legacy of U.S. military bases that had been built 
near their homes.  Yogi Koki, who was originally born in Okinawa, had left 
his family to work in Aichi Prefecture in the Island of Honshu, Japan’s 
largest main island.  He returned to his hometown in Okinawa to celebrate 
his 20th birthday, which was considered the entry into adulthood according 
to the local culture.165  Onda’s entire life had also been affected by his 
relation to the legacy of U.S. military, including his father’s death, the U.S. 
dropping of atomic bomb in Hiroshima, and his mother’s livelihood that 
depended on jobs at a nearby U.S. military base.  Second, they were both 
killed by military civil employees, not U.S. Armed Forces service personnel.  
Third, their deaths were not caused by their own actions or inaction, but were 
externally imposed by drivers who were either under the influence of 
alcohol, or perhaps, in the death of Yoshio Onda, driving carelessly, if not 
recklessly.  Fourth, in both cases, the U.S. military had held the primary 
jurisdiction over both incidents and decided that civic employees were in the 
 
 162. Beigun Hanzai: Beigungunzokujiko Fukiso Izoku Kenshin Moshitate-e [Military Crimes: 
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 163. Tsutomu Niigaki, Yamachuchi-ken Iwakuni Deno Doshu Jijitsu [The Same Incident in 
Iwakuni, Yamaguchi], Nichibei Chiikyotei-Kaisei o Jitsugensuru NGO [NGO for the Revision of 
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furtherance of their own official duty when the deadly incidents occurred.  
Fifth, in both instances, Japanese professional prosecutors issued the non-
indictment decision, citing the U.S.-Japan SOFA provision and primacy of 
U.S. jurisdiction over the incidents.  Lastly, victimized families and their 
proxies had filed complaints to local PRCs to review the propriety of the 
prosecutors’ non-indictment decisions. 
There are also significant differences in the outcome of PRC 
deliberations in Okinawa and Yamaguchi prefectures.  The Okinawa’s PRC 
petition was prepared by an experienced lawyer who had been well-versed 
in the “colonial” history of Okinawa which, according to Okinawan 
specialists, has been made into a “sacrifice zone” by both U.S. and Japanese 
governments.166  For instance, Attorney Toshio Ikemiyagi has represented 
many families whose members have been victimized by U.S. military 
personnel, including the late Koki Yogi and his grieving mother.  He also 
acted as a leader of many lawsuits filed by Okinawan residents against the 
Japanese government and its U.S.-related polices in Okinawa.  He is 
currently the leader of the U.S. Kadena Air Base anti-noise pollution 
litigation, representing approximately 22,000 Okinawan residents who live 
near the base.167 
The PRC petition on behalf of Yoshio Onda in Yamaguchi Prefecture 
was filed by his remaining family members and their supporters who had 
little legal background on the SOFA provision and little knowledge of 
important legal decisions regarding the status of military-related personnel.  
Similarly, the residents in Yamaguchi Prefecture have not faced the same 
degree of exploitation and “forced victimization” of residents, communities, 
environment, and ecosystems.  Article 4 of SOFA stipulates, for example, 
that U.S. government is not obliged to return the base and adjacent area to 
“the condition in which they were at the time they became available to the 
USAF, or to compensate Japan in lieu of such restoration.”168  Such a legal 
provision has resulted in the contamination and destruction of the 
environment and ecosystems of Okinawan villages and towns.  The town of 
Takaye, where Osprey helipad stations were recently constructed despite 
strong opposition by the residents, had been used as a quasi-camouflaged 
Vietnamese village during the Vietnam War.  The residents were forced to 
act as Vietnamese villagers during the military exercise simulation and had 
the defoliant Agent Orange sprayed over them as well as food crops, so as to 
 
 166. See generally, ROGER GOODMAN & KURSTEN REFSING, IDEOLOGY AND PRACTICE IN 
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 167. 22,000 File Suit Over Kadena Night Flights, JAPAN TIMES, Apr. 29, 2011. 
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investigate the impact of the herbicides.169  The villagers were never 
compensated for the contamination of their farmlands or the health effects 
stemming from their participation in the military simulation exercise.170 
The Japanese government’s treatment of the deaths of both Yogi Koki 
and Yoshio Onda demonstrated that the existing legal system has been 
designed to elevate the interests of U.S. and Japanese governments and their 
geo-strategic objectives over the rights and welfare of people, the nature, and 
ecosystems in Okinawa and elsewhere.  When Okinawan residents have been 
victimized by military personnel, the decisions of the Japanese government, 
including the prosecutors’ offices, have failed to ensure the safety and 
security of local residents and their communities, while “ignoring” their duty 
to punish the offenders.  The reluctance of Japanese public prosecutors to 
issue the indictment against civilian components of U.S. military reflected 
the overall bureaucratic culture of the Japanese government, thereby 
disregarding and marginalizing the rights of crime victims and their families.  
In addition to the provision of the 1954 secret directive of shobun seikun, it 
was also revealed that, in an attempt to prosecute U.S. military personnel, 
Japan’s public prosecutors were required to follow the special instruction 
from top ministerial officers, namely the Director of Public Prosecutors 
(Kenjicho), Attorney General (Kenji Socho), and Justice Minister (Ho-
sho).171  The directive thus led to the wholesale dismissal of criminal cases 
that victimized local residents and communities in Okinawa and beyond.  
The PRC then became an important legal vehicle with which to challenge 
the culture of impunity and complicity. 
 
C. Professor Carl F. Goodman’s Suggestion to Include “Mature 
Adults” in PRC Deliberations 
 
Georgetown Law Professor Carl F. Goodman offered an important 
suggestion that, in order to engage in equitable and fair PRC deliberations, 
it is important to invite legal specialists with politico-legal knowledge and 
international expertise so that the PRC’s deliberations should be reflective 
of, and incorporated into, a more consensual decision-making to comply 
with the overall interests of the government and the general public. Professor 
 
 169. Lisa Torio, Can Indigenous Okinawans Protect Their Land and Water from the US 
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Goodman provides a number of compelling reasons that sociopolitical 
experts should be included, in addition to lay participants, in PRC’s decision-
making in the post-2009 era.  For example, he warned that, without political 
and legal experts, there might be a potential for partisan political abuse of 
the PRC law, such as in the instance of what was most likely a politically 
motivated request to review the non-indictment decision on DPJ Secretary 
General Ichiro Ozawa.172  Professor Goodman suspected that the PRC-forced 
indictment might have possibly cost Ozawa the Prime Minister post.173 
Other reasons included the potential harm to national security when the 
PRC-forced indictment led to the prosecution of foreign nationals.  For 
instance, the PRC-forced indictment of a Chinese ship captain could have 
damaged the economic relationship with China, though he was quickly 
released by the Japanese government.174  Another indictment of U.S. military 
personnel had led to the violation of the jurisdictional authority of the U.S.-
Japan SOFA provision.  According to Professor Goodman, “[M]andatory 
indictment [of U.S. military-related personnel] could create an international 
incident between Japan and its single most important military partner.”175  
Other reasons he enlisted included the potential danger of damaging innocent 
persons caught in the PRC investigation process176 and the tremendous stress 
that the PRC process has placed on the rule of law, such as the indictment of 
a former police deputy chief, when the statute of limitation had already 
expired.177 
Thus, Professor Goodman suggests the following changes in the PRC 
law: (1) the training of PRC members with sample instructions prepared by 
the Japanese Supreme Court’s Secretariat to explain the PRC’s need to 
consider various issues, including the public interest and the rights of the 
target of their investigation; (2) the more active involvement of public 
prosecutors in providing the PRC exculpatory evidence involving the target 
of their investigation; and (3) in PRC reviews that possibly touch upon 
national security issues, the greater involvement of retired jurists of the 
Japanese Supreme Court, a former head of the Japan Federation of Bar 
Association, a retired Prosecutor General, a former Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, and retired presidents of Japan’s national and private universities, 
among others.178 
 
 172. See generally, Carl F. Goodman, Prosecution Review Commissions, the Public Interest, 
and the Right of the Accused: The Need for a “Grown Up” in the Room, 22 PACIFIC RIM LAW & 
POLICY JOURNAL 1 31, 32 (2013). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 33. 
 175. Id. at 35. 
 176. Id. at 33. 
 177. Id. at 33-34. 
 178. Id. at 42-43. 
5 -  Fukurai 7/29/2020  10:12 AM 
436 Hastings Journal of Crime and Punishment [Vol. 1:3 
These are important issues and agendas raised in order to improve the 
deliberative performance and quality of the PRC decision-making.  
Nonetheless, given the important civic oversight function of the PRC and its 
current independent deliberative process, the possible inclusion of multiple 
“mature adults” and their expert input in the deliberation may retard, if not 
totally eliminate, the possibility of reflecting civic views, popular voices, and 
citizens’ concerns related to the rights and interests of crime victims, 
families, and general communities.  As noted earlier, Japan’s overall 
criminal justice system has demonstrated that judge-led trials have elevated 
the rights and interests of the government, political authority, powerful 
corporate entities, and foreign nationals above and beyond the rights and 
interests of ordinary citizens, crime victims, their families and, overall, civil 
society at large.  In order to counter this long-standing situation, it thus seems 
that the composition of the PRC should remain as an exclusive civic 
institution, preserving its deliberative process without the participation of 
government officials and legal experts, including public prosecutors, 
professional judges, highly-placed government bureaucrats, and political and 




This paper has provided critical comments on the five invited scholars’ 
research presentations on the three new systems of popular and victim 
participation in Japan’s criminal justice process, including: (1) the PRC's 
new legally binding power to issue an indictment; (2) a mixed tribunal called 
Saiban’in Seido with three professional and six lay judges as an adjudicable 
body, and (3) a victim participation program that allowed crime victims, 
families, and their proxies to express their grievances in the criminal justice 
process. 
This paper also incorporated the TEPCO case into the discussion of the 
effectiveness of Japan’s new public and victim participation systems, and 
explored the possibility of public adjudication of white-collar criminals, i.e., 
those in entrusted positions whose professional and corporate negligence led 
to deaths and injuries.  The ministerial secretive directive called shobun 
seikun has long protected white-collar criminals and U.S. military personnel 
from prosecution in Japanese court.  Due to the government’s systemic 
refusal to indict and prosecute them, a culture of impunity has been fostered, 
leading to the continued victimization of ordinary citizens and communities. 
The PRC, which was first created in 1948 to review the propriety of non-
indictment decisions rendered by public prosecutors, became one of the rare 
civic institutions in Japan whose membership was solely composed of 
ordinary citizens randomly selected from the local community.  Its 
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deliberation was also conducted without the participation of government 
elites and legal experts.  The 2009 PRC law gave it the authority to issue a 
legally-binding indictment decision.  Among all PRC-forced indictment 
cases since 2009, white-collar crimes have constituted the majority, with five 
of nine cases (56%) and nine of thirteen defendants (69%).  In the trials, 
however, professional judges failed to convict a single PRC-indicted white-
collar defendant (0.0%). 
This paper also explored alternative trial venues in which to try white-
collar crime, including PRC-indicted cases, such as a Saiban’in tribunal and 
an American-style all-citizen, twelve-member jury, which Japan had once 
operated from 1928 to 1943.  This paper also examined the PRC-indictment 
case in Okinawa, which led to the decision by the U.S.-Japan Joint 
Committee to create the administrative exception in the SOFA’s “immunity” 
provision, and ultimately allowed the prosecution of the civilian component 
of U.S. military personnel in Japanese court.  The PRC deliberation in 
Okinawa was compared to another PRC decision in Yamaguchi Prefecture, 
regarding the death of civilians at the hands of U.S. base personnel.  The 
creative use of the PRC decision and deliberation was explored in relation to 
state crime, i.e., the state’s refusal to prosecute criminals, even when the 
prosecution was mandated by its own national law.  It is our hope that the 
creative use of PRC and its legally binding indictment decision will 
ultimately elevate the interests and rights of people, community, and civil 
society at large over the rights and interests of government bureaucrats, 
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